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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
In view of the multiple parties and the roles which 
they play in this action, it is not deemed feasible to recognize 
the parties as plaintiff, defendant, crossclaimant, etc. 
Accordingly, throughout this brief, the parties will be recog-
nized by name. The plaintiff, Mallory Engineering, Inc., will 
be designated throughout this brief as "Mallory"; the defendant, 
Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc., as "Brown"; the defendant, Valad 
Electric Heating Corp., as "Valad". 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of an order for the manufacture 
of certain heaters, to conform to the requirements of Mallory, 
and guaranteed and certified by the manufacturer, Valad, to meet 
these requirements; which in fact, upon delivery, did not meet 
these requirements, giving rise to a claim for damages by Mallory, 
which Mallory asserts against both Brown and Valad, Brown having 
placed the order for the heaters with Valad. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Trial to the Court sitting without a jury took place 
January 19, 1976, to and including January 29, 1976. The Court 
awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff Mallory against 
defendants Brown, and against the defendant Valad; and awarded 
judgment in favor of the defendant Brown against the defendant 
Valad for the full amount of judgment awarded by the Court to 
- 2 -
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Mallory against Brown, together with the amount of loss 
suffered by Brown by reason of Valad's failure to manufacture 
and deliver the heaters to Mallory as required. The Court denie: 
the counterclaim and crossclaim of Valad and the same was dis-
missed upon its merits. (R. 696) The judgment reserved issues 
on the counterclaim and amended counterclaim between Brown and 
Mallory for future trial by the Court. (R. 678, 679) 
Upon motion to the Court, the Court amended the judgrnen: 
and added to the judgment a provision limiting the total liabilit: 
of Valad under the judgment awarded to Mallory and the judgment 
awarded to Brown, to the amount of the loss suffered by Mallory 
plus the loss suffered by Brown. (R. 695, 696) The parties 
filed with the Court objections to the findings of fact, conclus:::J 
of law, and the proposed judgment, portions of which resulted in 
some amendments to the judgment. These amendments were incorpord 
in the judgment as entered. The Court, however, elected to consi:~ 
the objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment as a motion for new trial. It made and entered its 
order denying the motion for new trial. (R. 680, 681) 
The appeals basically are taken from the judgment as 
amended (R. 695, 696), and the order of the Court denying the 
motion for new trial. (R. 680, 681) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Brown seeks reversal of the judgment granted by the le•'~ 
Court to Mallory against Brown, and affirrnance of the judgment 
awarded to Brown against Valad for the loss suffered by Brown 
- 3 -
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as a result of Valad's failure of performance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The theatrical and argumentatively characterized 
statement of facts contained in Valad's brief fails to accurately 
set forth the fundamental and factual details essential for 
consideration by this Court. Accordingly, Brown elects to make 
its own statement of facts. 
Mallory had a contract with the United States Government 
to build certain environmental test chambers. (T. 4, Ex. 1, 2, 3) 
It was in need of electric heaters to perform certain functions 
in connection with the government contract. (T. 10) Roy Mallory, 
president of Mallory, asked Brown, through its representative 
Nyman, if it had a source from which such heaters could be 
obtained. (T. 311) Carl Nyman, a sales representative of Brown, 
made inquiry and located literature and catalog data indicating 
Valad Electric Heating Corp. as a possible fabricator, and sub-
mitted this sales and catalog data and information on the company 
to Mr. Roy Mallory, President of Mallory. (T. 99, 311, 312) 
(Ex. 42, 43, 44, 45) Mr. Nyman made clear to Mallory that it 
had not had previous experience with Valad as a manufacturer. 
(T. 100, 311) It appeared that Valad had the potential to 
make the heaters. (T. 97, 98, 311, 312) Mr. Roy Mallory, President 
of Mallory, advised Mr. Nyman that he might be able to use heaters 
manufactured by Valad and that he would consider them. (T. 312) 
Some two months after the original presentation to Roy Mallory, 
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Mallory contacted Brown through ~yman and asked Brown to obtain 
a quotation on some heaters to be utilized in these government 
test chambers. (T. 313) Mr. Mallory furnished to Nyman of Brown 
the electrical kilowatt capacity required of the heater, the 
voltage required, the size capabilities and limitations, and the 
airflow, as well as the sheath temperature requirements. (T. 313) 
Nyman of Brown submitted this information by telephone to Valad 
through Peter Cecchini, its office manager. (T. 314, 315) The 
quotations on the original criteria did not give rise to orders. 
(T. 318-321) Subsequently, Mallory supplied to Brown new specific 
performance criteria on the size, type and limitations of the 
heaters and asked for a new quotation. (T. 321-323) Nyman of Bw~ 
submitted this information by telephone to Valad in December of 
1972; and Peter Cecchini, speaking for Valad, affirmed that Valad 
could make the heaters and furnished to Nyman by telephone the 
dimensional and electrical data, as well as a price quote which 
was furnished by Nyman to Mallory. (T. 584) The quote was 
accepted by Mallory and a purchase order issued for the first 
of a seri~s of heaters. This order was number 4016. (Ex. 9) 
Brown issued its purchase order transmitting the Mallory purchase 
order, Brown's purchase order being number 6730. (Ex. 10) The 
purchase order issued by Mallory to Brown and transmitted by 
Brown to Valad contained this language: 
"Fabricator shall also submit written certi-
fication that sheath temperature will not exceed 
plus 250° F. when operating at continuous full 
voltage with a 5 F.P.S. air volocity and the 
maximum air temperature of plus 160° F." (Ex. 9) 
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Certain drawings were submitted by Valad to Mallory 
direct. (Ex. 17, 18) (T. 106) After review of the drawings 
by Mr. Farber of Mallory with Mr. Nyman of Brown, clearance 
was given for manufacture. (Ex. 11, 20) (T. 139) The shop 
drawings submitted did not give the details necessary for Nyman 
or Mallory to evaluate the heater performance characteristics, 
but was limited solely to dimension and configuration. (T. 279) 
The heaters were not delivered in accordance with the 
schedule set forth on the purchase orders and by subsequent 
correspondence. Mallory dealt directly with Valad in connection 
with the matter of delay in delivery. (T. 345, 346) When the 
15- and 21-watt kilowatt heaters were received, they did not 
conform to the requirements of the purchase order and the 
certification and guarantee which had been issued directly by 
Valad to Mallory. (T. 36, 75, 86, 105) (Ex. 22, 23) 
When received and tested, the heaters did not perform 
and were found to be deficient in capacity and have excessive 
sheath temperatures. (T. 127, 128) Mallory was required to 
obtain substitute heaters from other sources as Valad refused 
to take any steps to correct the situation. (T. 75) Regan 
Engineering made replacement heaters. (R. 91) 
The foregoing is a statement of the essential facts 
involved in this action. The factual situation is relatively 
simple. The complexities arise from the effort of Valad to 
shift to either Brown or Mallory the responsibility for its 
- 6 -
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incompetence and failure to manufacture in accordance with 
requirements. Additional facts will be set forth in the argument 
as may be requisite to the presentation thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE UTAH COURT DOES HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE 
DEFENDANT VALAD: A. UNDER THE "LONG-ARM STATUTE", UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953), SEC. 78-27-22, ET SEQ., AND PARTICULARLY 
SEC. 78-27-24(2) (3). B. THE DEFENDANT APPEARED AND SUBMITTED 
ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
In support of part "A" of this point, we submit Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) (as amended), Sec. 78-27-22, carries a 
statement of the legislative policy established by the legislatur: 
in enacting the "Long-Arm Statute". It specifically sets forth 
the fact that the "Long-Arm Statute" should be applied to assert 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
"It is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that the public interest demands 
the state provide its citizens with an effective 
means of redress against nonresident persons, 
who through certain significant minimal contacts 
with this state, incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection. This 
legislative action is deemed necessary because 
of technological progress which has substantially 
increased the flow of commerce between the 
several states, resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons of other 
states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum 
protection to citizens of this state, should 
- 7 -
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be applied so as to assert jurisdiction 
over non-resident defendant to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution." 
The Code sets forth in Sec. 24 certain specific conduct 
or acts which may give rise to a claim by a Utah resident against 
a non-resident wherein a non-resident will be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court. 
"Any person, notwithstanding Sec. 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: 
(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or 
goods in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within 
this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; ••. " 
(Emphasis ours) 78-27-24 UCA (1953) (as amended) 
There is no dispute that Valad Electric Heating Corp. 
contracted to supply heaters in the State of Utah. Since the 
heaters did not function properly, and in an effort to avoid 
the responsibility for this failure, much effort has been expended 
by Valad in analyzing the relationship between the respective 
parties, Mallory Engineering, Inc., and Ted R. Brown & Associates, 
Inc., as to whether the contract ran from Valad to Brown or 
from Valad to Mallory; but there has not been any denial at 
any time that there was indeed a contract and that heaters were 
manufactured and were shipped by Valad directly to Mallory in 
- 8 -
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the State of Utah for use in Mallory's business in this state 
in producing an envirorunental test chamber. In addition, 
defendant Valad issued a direct certificate of guarantee or 
warranty of performance to Mallory Engineering, Inc. This 
certification was required as a condition to the contract. 
(R. 104, 105) (Ex. 22, 23) 
In the recent case of Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. vs. Piper 
Aircraft decided April 14, 1978, 578 P.2d 850, this Court has 
clearly established that where a party does one of the acts 
establishing jurisdiction under the "Long-Arm Statute", it 
subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. Valad 
contracted to supply heaters built by it for a specific function 
and which it warranted would meet the requirements of the Utah 
consumer, namely Mallory Engineering, Inc. The action of Valad 
was voluntary in contracting to supply the heaters in Utah. 
It desired the business, it must therefore accept the respon-
sibility entailed, and the jurisdiction over Valad is established 
by the act cited. We respectfully submit that the Utah case 
above cited is dispositive of the arguments advanced by the 
defendant Valad wherein it seeks to avoid the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court under the "Long-Arm Statute". 
Secondly, in support of part "B" of this point, there , 
can be no question but that Valad waived any jurisdictional 
question and entered a general appearance in this action. The 
attempt by counsel in the brief submitted on this issue to lump 
all of the actions of Valad in the District Court under one 
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blanket car~'1ot be successful. Counsel clai.-r.s in its brief that 
Valad did not enter a general appearance, basing its claim on 
the specious argument that the documents filed with the District 
Court consisted solely of one document, and that this document 
raised at the first opportunity the jurisdictional 
question with or without special appearance. An examination 
of the document clearly shows that this is not the fact. We 
refer the Court to the record, pages 23 thro.ugh 34. While 
counsel for Valad elected to bind in a single blue cover two 
separate documents, this does not make these documents one 
document or act before the Court. They are distinct and separate 
items. The first document accessible upon examination is an 
answer, counterclaim and cross-complaint to the pleading of 
Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc. The second document is an 
answer to Mallory's complaint. It is true that in the so-called 
"answer" the defense of jurisdiction over the defendant Valad 
is raised; but even in that document, it is not, as has been 
traditionally required, raised as the initial defense before 
responding to the remainder of the pleading. Instead, the 
answer responds directly by specific answer and denial or 
admission to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. 
(R. 24) It then seeks to raise the jurisdictional question. 
While we recognize that the Court has liberalized 
greatly the rules relating to "special appearance", and has 
under the Utah rule permitted the jurisdictional matter to be 
raised other than by special pleading and as a part of the 
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it has, ~evertbe:ess, i~sis~ed upon the 
presentation of t.~is cefense in a manner which alerts both 
the Court and parties to the claimed defect in jurisdiction. 
Rather than raise and stand upon the defense of lack of juris-
diction in any manner, the defendant has submitted to the 
jurisdiction and answered to a cross-complaint. The complaint 
in this action was filed September 20, 1973. (R. 2) The answer, 
counterclaim and cross-complaint of Brown was not filed until 
October 15, 1973. The complaint and summons were served by the 
Sheriff in New York upon the defendant Valad. (R. 442) The 
pleading by Brown was served by Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested, upon Valad Electric Heating Corp., at 71 Courtland 
Street, Terry Town, New York, 10591. (R. 19) No confusion could 
exist as to the fact that these were two separate documents, 
two separate pleadings filed by two separate parties, and called 
for distinct and separate responses. The requirement of response 
to Brown's pleading was conditioned upon the jurisdiction of 
the Court established through the service of the summons and 
the complaint; for the method elected by Brown to serve the 
cross-complaint was pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure 
of Utah. If the defendant Valad asserted and intended to rely 
upon the assertion of lack of jurisdiction, no necessity arose 
for response to the pleading of Brown. By recognizing the 
validity of this pleading and responding thereto without 
raising any jurisdictional question in such responsive pleading, 
and by asserting therein an affirmative defense; and setting 
- 11 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
forth by title a crossclaim and coW1terclaim and seeking 
general relief thereon, the defendant clearly waived the issue 
of jurisdiction and appeared in the Utah Court. The fact that 
the two separate documents were enclosed in one blue-cover 
binding cannot be said to make them one pleading. The pleading 
to Brown's cross-complaint waived the jurisdictional defense. 
It should be further noted that from the inception of 
the case until the case was ready to be set for trial, no further 
objection to jurisdiction of the Court was made by Valad. Valad 
consistently subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Court by responding to interrogatories, requests for admission, 
and other pleadings. The sole basis for responding to these 
pleadings is the requirement of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Counsel in his brief claims that the response to discovery and 
the filing of other pleadings does not subject Valad to the 
personal jurisdiction of the Court. Yet, in the same brief at 
page 13, he states: 
"All of these discovery responses were 
filed pursuant to the mandatory rules 
requiring responses to lawful discovery 
requests." 
Response under the Rules can only be enforced where 
the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant. Failing juris-
diction, no duty to respond exists. 
Some effort is made in Valad's brief to assert that 
by reason of the fact that the corporation was appearing pro se, 
that no appearance could be established. This argument is 
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tenuous at best, but clearly disposed of by the fact that 
the further blue-backed responses made by Valad carried the 
name of counsel. We respectfully call the Court's attention 
to p. 74 of the record, and p. 107 of the record, both of which 
are on a printed form of Godfrey P. Schmidt, Attorney at Law, 
and both of which carry the statement that he is the attorney 
for Valad. Likewise, they carry the identification of the 
contents just above the name of the attorney. It has been 
repeatedly held that a corporation which appears improperly 
through an agent other than its attorney may not avoid the 
results of a proceeding by alleging the impropriety of its own 
appearance. 19 ALR 3d, 1073 at 1087. In the annotation above 
cited, the annotating authority states: 
"The filing of an appearance through the 
president of the defendant corporation, 
who was an attorney, was termed an 'obvious 
impropriety' in American Sand & Gravel, 
Inc. vs. Clark & Fray Construction Company, 
2 Conn. Cir. 284, 198(a) 2d 68; but the 
Court, in rendering a judgment for the 
plaintiff for an amount due on a purchase 
by the defendant, stated that the defendant 
had been afforded an opportunity to have 
its case fully and thoroughly heard." 
Officers of the corporation were held to have entered 
a voluntary appearance even though not represented by attorneys 
in other cases cited in the annotation. Under the circumstances 
here, the fact that the attorney did not sign the pleading which 
he enclosed in his printed cover bearing his name and filed 
with the Court, should offer no protection to the corporate 
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defendant. The District Court ruled that Valad had appeared 
and that it must obtain local counsel or it would be considered 
in default. (R. 128, 129) Valad recognized the order and 
did promptly appear through counsel. (R. 135, 136) The appearance 
entered purported to be a special appearance. It is submitted 
that this was manifestly untimely, and the effort to raise the 
question of jurisdiction by pleadings, which the Court inter-
preted as a motion to quash service of summons, was promptly 
dealt with by the District Court, after due hearing by an order 
of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, denying the 
motion to quash service of summons. This order was made and 
entered the 28th day of April, 1975. (R. 170) An appeal from 
the order was taken but dismissed by the Supreme Court, which 
by its remittitur simply provided that: 
"Issue of jurisdiction may be reserved as 
issue on ultimate appeal, if taken." 
We respectfully submit to this Court that for the 
reasons set forth herein, the jurisdiction of the Utah Court 
over Valad is firmly established. 
Point II 
TED R. BROWN & ASSOCIATES, INC., SERVED ONLY IN THE CAPACITY OF 
INTERMEDIARY IN PLACING MALLORY'S ORDER FOR HEATERS WITH VALAD 
FOR MANUFACTURE AND SHOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCOMPETENCE 
OF VALAD WHICH RESULTED IN DEFECTIVE MANUFACTURE OF THE HEATERS. 
Had Valad syntactically diagramed the sentence structure 
of the purchase orders of Mallory and Brown and applied the law 
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cited by counsel relating to the formation of contracts as 
diligently as has counsel in trying to relieve Valad from the 
consequences of its own incompetence, this case would not now 
be before the Court. See the syntactical diagram. (R. 572) 
There is a maxim of law frequently applied by the Court that 
the Court will look to the substance, not form, in evaluating 
a relationship between parties to litigation. Illustrative 
of this principal is the situation wherein the parties intending 
to create security for a loan will use a Warranty Deed in place 
of a mortgage. The Courts have repeatedly held that while 
on its face and by its form the transaction appears to be an 
outright conveyance, the true relationship of the parties will 
be determined from the intent and action of the parties; and 
the Warranty Deed is treated as a mortgage. 
There is abundant Utah case law supporting the 
principal that the meaning and affect to be given a contract 
depend upon the intent of the parties, and that is to be ascer-
tained by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts 
in their relationship to each other. See Thomas J. Peck & Sons 
vs. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446. 
In the case of Harding, Inc. vs. Eimco Corporation, 
266 p.2d 494, the Court recognized that in interpretation of 
a contract the interpretation given by the parties themselves, 
as shown by their acts, will be adopted by the Court. Use 
of the conduct of the parties themselves as a basis for deter-
mination of a contractual relationship is recognized statutortl~ 
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in the Uniform Commercial Code. 70(A)-2-207(3), UCA (1953) 
(as amended), relating to the subject of sales, states: 
"Conduct by both parties which recognizes 
the existence of a contract, is sufficient 
to establish a contract for sale, although 
the writings of the parties do not otherwise 
establish a contract. In such case, the 
terms of the particular contract consist of 
those terms on which the writings of the 
parties agree, together with any supple-
mentary terms incorporated under any other 
provisions of this act." 
Brown does not dispute the contention of Mallory that 
the heaters supplied by Valad were defective and were not 
manufactured in accordance with the mandate of the purchase 
order of Mallory as transmitted by Brown to Valad; and that the 
heaters did not conform to the warranty or certification issued 
by Valad directly to Mallory. The contention between Brown 
and Mallory is Mallory's effort to make Brown responsible for 
the default of Valad. We submit that a reasonable interpretation 
of the documents and the actions of the parties will not support 
Mallory's claim against Brown; and the lower Court erred when 
it granted Mallory judgment against Brown, and also against Valad. 
From the beginning, Mallory knew that Brown was simply attempting 
to locate a source of supply to provide heaters to Mallory with 
the dual hope that by so doing they would accommodate an established 
customer, and secondly, earn a small commission or fee for their 
efforts. 
Lee Farber, president and general manager of Mallory, 
testified with regard to Brown as follows: 
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"Question: Now, in making that requirement 
that you set up through your exhibit -
through Exhibit no. 4, your criteria, you 
knew that Ted R. Brown & Associates could 
not, from their own facilities, provide 
that equipment, didn't you? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And so you knew that they were 
going to get these from Valad Manufacturing 
Company, the agency that is represented 
by those documents Exhibits 42-4S(b)? 
Answer: It was indicated that if we gave 
Ted R. Brown the purchase order for the 
heaters, that Valad would be the manufacturer 
of those heaters." (T. 102, lines 10-20) 
Again, this same witness, at transcript 104, line 2, 
answered the question as follows: 
"Question: You required in that purchase 
order that the performance of these heaters 
be certified not by Brown, but by the 
manufacturer, did you not? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: So that you were not looking to 
Brown to certify or to pass upon the quality 
or the performance of this heater? You were 
expecting the manufacturer to warrant to 
you the performance characteristics of this 
heater? 
Answer: This purchase order 4016 is strictly 
a performance purchase order. There is no 
design data in here upon which I can build 
a heater. The heater manufacturer has to 
look at the performance criteria, and from 
this criteria, based upon his specific way 
of doing business, he has to design. He has 
to make the proper application. And our 
purchase order says we are looking, as part 
of our contract with Brown, that whoever 
builds that heater, will certify that it 
will be constructed to meet the requirements, 
the performance requirements that we stipulated. 
Question: And in this case, that would be 
directed to Valad? 
Answer: If Valad was manufacturer, that was 
where the certification should be issued from. 
Question: And you knew that's where the 
manufacture was going to be? 
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Answer: Yes. It was indicated. We 
didn't have any contract to enforce that 
upon Brown, however." (T. 104, lines 2-26) 
Mr. Nyman of Ted R. Brown explained the procedure at 
Ted R. Brown & Associates in handling of an order such as the 
order placed by Mallory with Brown for heaters. In response 
to the question asked as to what was done with the order received 
from Mallory, Mr. Nyman testified: 
"After receiving the particular purchase 
order from Mallory, we did, as we normally 
do, and always do, type up our covering 
purchase order, send on to Valad our order 
referring to the requirements of Mallory's 
order for these particular heaters. 
Question: Now do you type up a purchase 
order of your own? Excuse me. Why do 
you type up a purchase order of Ted R. 
Brown & Associates? 
Answer: We do this with all of our orders. 
It allows us a basic numerical bookkeeping 
system by which we can keep track of all 
orders, and we do set up this as a standard 
procedure, and all orders that come through 
Ted R. Brown & Associates from a buyer 
to a manufacturer are set up on one of 
our purchase orders." (T. 323, lines 13-27) 
Thus, while the form pf the transaction characterized 
by the issuance of purchase orders by Brown to Valad for the 
heaters to be supplied Mallory would seem to indicate a purchase 
by Brown and a resale to Mallory, the actual treatment of this 
transaction by the parties reflected that all concerned knew 
that, in fact, Brown was not purchasing the heaters and reselling 
them, but was simply serving as an intermediary, having referred 
the purchase order of Mallory to Valad for manufacture and 
sale. The purchase orders themselves required that the product 
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be shipped directly to Mallory. (Ex. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) 
The method of obtaining approval as to manufacturing details 
resulted in Valad submitting the drawings directly to Mallory, 
not to Brown. (T. 32) When problems developed, either in 
connection with the delivery data, or in connection with the 
ultimate function of the heaters after shipment, the contacts 
were between Mallory and Valad. (T. 45) Even after Valad failed 
to make correction, Mallory made demand on Valad for performance 
and did not give to Brown a copy or a demand of any nature. 
(T. 80-84 inc.) Peter Cecchini, the general manager for Valad, 
in his testimony, when asked why he had dealt directly with 
Mallory rather than with his claimed purchaser, Brown, stated: 
"Question: And in all of the calls that you 
made, and sometimes Mr. Mccarron was on the 
line, too? 
Answer: That is correct. 
Question: You made those to Mr. Farber? 
Why weren't you making them to your 
customer, Mr. Brown? 
Answer: Because the trouble was at Mallory 
Engineering, and Mr. Farber had the trouble." 
(T. 472) 
It is interesting to note that none of the heaters 
which were actually manufactured by Valad for Mallory were 
made correctly. Even the heaters which were replaced and even-
tually used, the 12-kilowatt heaters were originally made wrong 
and came out to Mallory as only 2-kilowatt heaters, rather than 
12-kilowatt heaters. (T. 456) A review of the testimony of 
Peter Cecchini discloses the total incompetence of this man. 
Throughout, if the questioning began to appear to Mr. Cecchini 
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to indicate that there was some responsibility at Valad for 
the unsatisfactory results, he became evasive and hid behind 
the shield that he had no technical knowledge of electricity. 
(T. 459, lines 12-14) While having answered interrogatories 
to the effect that he had a degree in industrial engineering, 
(R. 87, Int. No. 16) when questioned on the stand, he claimed 
that his only area of expertise lay in the business field; and 
that the industrial engineering degree which he possessed did 
not make him qualified in any sense in the field of electrical 
engineering, but only indicated that he had a knowledge of 
plant layouts and things of that nature. (T. 499,500) Throughout 
his testimony, Mr. Cecchini was evasive; and in one instance 
it became manifest that while he attempted to place the blame 
on Ted R. Brown & Associates for the errors made in manufacture 
claiming that the information furnished by Brown was inaccurate, 
he finally had to admit that the error, at least in connection 
with the 12-kilowatt heater, were errors in his own plant. 
(T. 456) The effort expended by Valad to evade responsibility 
for its own incompetence is unbelievable. Pages and pages of 
the transcript of record in this case deal with such items as 
the general custom of Valad in regard to its manufacturing 
process being broken down into three categories, namely A, 
B, and c. The first class, according to Mr. Cecchini, was 
stock items which they made and held in stock to fill customer's 
orders. The second item was a modified version of the first 
class wherein the customer approaches Valad with something of 
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his own invention, supplies all the design and manufacture 
parameters, and the company then manufactures the heaters from 
these design parameters. The class C, or third type, is where 
the customer comes and states that he wants an end result, and 
pays a special fee for design by Valad. In such cases, Valad 
always makes a prototype, according to Mr. Cecchini; and if 
this is satisfactory and the tests prove the heater satisfactory, 
then the production is commenced, but the customer pays for 
all costs in such case. (T. 425, 426) 
Almost in the same breath, Mr. Cecchini admitted that 
the error in the manufacture of the 12-kilowatt heaters resulted 
from the company's not following the instructions received for 
the heater's manufacture as a part of the purchase order of 
Mallory wh.ich required the 12-kilowatt output. And while 
having testified at length that the production department never 
proceeded with the manufacture of an item until it had received 
an approved drawing, when confronted with the approved drawing 
which red-lined or showed clearly that the company's attention 
had been drawn by Mallory to the error, and that the heater 
should be a 12-kilowatt heater instead of a 2-kilowatt heater, 
Mr. Cecchini was unable to offer any explanation for this mistake. 
(T. 456) 
Initially, Mr. Cecchini, when taken on direct examinac:· 
by his own counsel, attempted to testify with regard to telephone 
conversations with Mr. Nyman of Brown, claiming that he had 
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notes of the telephone conversations. He proved totally 
incapable of so testifying. (T. 359-368 inc.) As is so 
frequently the case, he was saved by Court recess. (T. 368); 
and upon return to the stand, he had been adequateiy informed 
by counsel as to what he should be testifying to. Unfortunately, 
however, even with the help of the recess to rearrange his 
testimony, Mr. Cecchini was unable to keep things straight. 
To review the testimony of Mr. Cecchini is to become 
thoroughly aware of the total incompetence of this man. He 
did not know anything about electrical heaters, and yet he 
proudly claimed that he was the one that made the interpretations 
and made the sketches that set the thing up for manufacture; 
and yet when questioned as to any technical aspects of the 
matter in question, he retreated behind his own lack of ability 
and claimed that he was not capable in the area of electrical 
engineering. (T. 454-467) 
The principal defect which was the reason that the 
heaters had to be rejected by Mallory was that the 15-kilowatt 
heaters and the 21-kilowatt heaters which, by the terms of 
the purchase order from Mallory as forwarded by Brown, were 
required to meet this requirement did not do so: 
"Fabricator to specify required depth. Heater 
to be designed for a maximum sheath temperature 
of plus 250° F. when operating at continuous 
full voltage with a 5 F.P.S. air velocity, 
and a maximum air temperature of plus 160° F." 
(Ex. 4) 
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Similar requirements were made for the 21KW heater 
to that of the 15 KWheater, the air temperature, however, being 
slightly higher. The heaters furnished by Valad did not meet 
this requirement. (T. 39) Much time was expended in trial in 
the effort by Valad to show that the heaters as manufactured 
by them relied upon thermostats which turned the power on and off 
in order to control Sheath temperature. According to Valad, 
this was a satisfactory means of compliance with the language 
quoted. Valad tried to show that by virtue of approval of 
certain drawings by Mallory the use of thermostats for this 
purpose had been approved. This was denied by both Mallory 
and Brown. It was shown that the drawings did not give the 
detail which would permit the party to whom the drawings were 
submitted for approval to evaluate the heaters from a performance 
standpoint. 
The only expert who was totally independent and had 
the requisite engineering qualifications, Mr. Thomas, a graduate 
Professional Electrical Engineer produced by Mallory as a witness, 
set at rest the effort by valad to justify the use of thermostats 
to interrupt the flow of current as a means of control of sheath 
temperature as being compliant with the express terms of Mallory's 
purchase order. 
in other words, I would assume that 
this thermostat is being used to control the 
heater down to the swing between 250 and 200 
degrees. 
Q. Is this a proper use of a thermostat, Mr. Thomas? 
A. It could be a proper use. In this case, with the 
specifications as I read them, it calls for 15 KW at 
continuous full voltage. 
Q. So, when you were reading it in connection with 
these specifications in this purchase order which 
says continuous full voltage, would that be in 
compliance with this purchase order? 
A. No, sir. I would say, that in my interpretation 
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of these specifications are that I am to have 
the use of a lSKW heaters all the ti.me, and 
they will maintain a sheath temperature of 250 
degrees. I don't see here where the 15 KW should 
be cut off to comply with the 250 degrees. " (T.599-600) 
Again, in further examination Mr. Thomas specifically 
states that, in his opinion, any other interpretation of the 
purchase orders than to require the maintenance of the temper-
atures at continuous full voltage, would be in error. (T. 611 L 5-18) 
Ultimately in the testimony of Mr. Mccarron, the 
factory superintendent for Valad, upon interrogation by Judge 
Taylor, he admitted that Valad could have manufactured a heater 
in accordance with the specifications. It simply did not. (T.561) 
It is thus established that the cause of the problem 
is that Valad misinterpreted the requirements submitted to it. 
Merely because Brown used the device of issuing its own purchase 
order to Valad for the heaters in order to enable it to obtain 
a price differential by way of a cornrnission, since it was not 
a sales representative of Vala~ should not make Brown the 
0uarantor of performance by Valad. Despite the effort expended 
it was never shown that Brown ever did anything actually wrong 
which caused the problem, or was responsible for the deficiency 
in performance by Valad. 
Even looking upon Brown as Valad insists be done, as 
the Vendee of Valad as Vendor, there is substantial authority 
to the effect that performance may be excused under the Uniform 
Commercial Code as enacted in Utah. In discussing this subject, 
Am. Jur. 2d, vol. 67, SALES at Sec. 362 Pg. 513, states:-
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The Uniform Commercial Code does not catalog 
the various contingencies that might excuse 
delay or non-delivery, with the exception of 
referring to that arising from governmental 
regulations. However, it follo"5pre-code 
concepts by excusing a seller from the timely 
delivery of goods contracted for where his 
performance has become commercially impractic-
able because of unforseen supervening circum-
stances not within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the contracting. In 
addition, circumstances that might excuse per-
formance include a marked increase in costs 
because of unforseen circumstances, and an 
unanticipated failure of the source of supply, 
where the contract contemplates the use of only 
a particular source, such as the failure of a 
crop under a contract to sell the crop growing 
on a designated land .... " (emphasis ours) 
There is no dispute that all of the parties contemplated 
that the manufacturer was to be Valad. It was the source of the 
heaters. Its failure to manufacture in accordance with the 
requirements and its commitments certainly excuse the failure 
to perform by Brown, who was nothing more than an intermediary 
in transmit ting the order to the manufacturer. The same authority 
at Sec. 365, Pg. 516, states: 
"It has been held that where a seller under-
takes to sell particular good~ which he is 
obtaining under a specified contract from a 
third person, the unjustified refusal of such 
third person to make such goods available to 
the seller, excuses the seller from his own 
contract." 
valad' s refusal to make proper heaters to conform to 
the order placed with it by Brown is proved in the record. No 
justification was ever proved by Valad for its failure. It simpl!' 
relied on its contention that it manufactured what the specifi-
cations called for. The refusal to recognize its own error and 
make the corrections called for on the 15KW and the 21 KW heate'. 
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and to manufacture the 36KW and the SOKW heaters as ordered 
is clearly an unjustified refusal to perform its contract and 
it should excuse Brown under the law cited. 
POINT III 
THE LAW RECOGNIZES THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS 
AND SANCTIONS DIRECT DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTERMEDIARY. 
In support of a motion by Brown to dismiss the 
Plaintiff Mallory's complaint as to Brown, Brown presented an 
argument and authorities to the Court supporting Brown's 
contention that Brown should not be involved in the controversy 
which basically involves only Mallory and Valad. At the 
conclusion of the argument the Court indicated that its 
persuasion then was, 
"I suppose the purpose, really,, and I am 
sufficiently in doubt as to Mr. Tibbals' 
client, Brown's position, that I think 
probably the burden of persuasion would 
be on the Plaintiff to persuade me that they 
were something more than an intermediary, and 
probably simultaneously the briefs can be 
prepared on that issue ...•• " (T. 632) 
No justification appears in the record for the 
Court to have changed its position and award judgment to 
Mallory against Brown, nor does such justification exist in 
fact. As shown in the argument under Point II of this brief 
the parties throughout have treated Brown as a mediator or 
intermediary. Webster defines and Intermediary as follows: 
"One who or that which is intermediate; hence 
a mediator; an interagent; a go-between. " 
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In a case arising in the State of Washington the 
Court was confronted with an almost factually paralell situatior .. 
In the case of KADIAK FISHERIES COMPANY vs. MURPHY DIESEL 
COMPANY, 422 P2d 496; 70 Wash. 2d 153; the case involved a 
fishing vessel owned by Kadiak. It needed a new motor. The 
President of Kadiak discussed the matter with Alaska Pacific 
Supply Company, the western Washington sales agent for the 
Murphy Diesel Company. The discussion resulted in Kadiak's 
desires and needs being communicated to Murphy Diesel through 
Alaska Pacific as well as through a regional sales representative 
of Murphy and an acceptance of an order by Murphy for a 325 
horsepower, dry manifold, marine diesel motor, expecially 
constructed to fit the bed of the Kadiak vessel, the Jaguar. 
The motor proved unsatisfactory and Kadiak sued both the Alaska 
and the Murphy Diesel companies. The Court states, 
"Throughout the trial it was Kadiak's theory 
that privity of contract was established and 
existed because (a) Alaska Pacific was an 
agent of Murphy Diesel, or (b) Alaska Pacific 
was the agent of Kadiak in the transaction, or 
(c) Kadiak was the third party beneficiary of a 
sales contract between Alaska Pacific and Murphy 
Diesel. Murphy Diesel denied privity, asserting 
that the relationship between it and Alaska Pacific 
was that of vendor and vendee, with Kadiak the 
remote purchaser from Alaska Pacific. " P2d Pg 503 
The trial court permitted the case to go to the jury 
on the issue of Murphy Diesel's responsibility for the damage 
and refused further instructions to insulate it from the plainti::·i 
claim based on the Murphy Diesel contention that its vendee was 
Alaska Pacific. The Supreme Court found no error in the action 
of the trial court and said: 
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"\'le find no prejudicial error flowing to Murphy 
Diesel from the action of the trial court. We 
reach this conclusion because, accepting Murphy 
Diesel's thesis that its relationship with Alaska 
Pacific was that of vendor and vendee, we are con-
vinced from our view of the statement of facts that 
the evidence conclusively established Kadiak as the 
third party beneficiary of the sale of the motor in 
question by Murphy Diesel. Jeffery v. Hanson 
39 Wash 2d 855, 239 P2d 346 (1952) 
"Murphy Diesel knew the identity, the purpose, and 
requirements of Alaska Pacific's customer -- Kadiak. 
It engineered and constructed the motor to meet 
certain specifications, e. g. the bed of the Jaguar, 
furnished to it not only by Alaska Pacific but by one 
of its own regional sales representatives. Although 
it invoiced the motor through Alaska Pacific, it 
shipped the motor direct to Kadiak. Some communications 
were carried on directly between Kadiak and the factory 
before and after shipment. An official of the company 
the regional sales representative, and a factory 
service man visited the Jaguar on various occasions 
before and during installation of the motor, and the 
service man participated in adjustments and corrections 
for the final trial run. After the fire and after 
further mechanical troubles developed Murphy Diesel 
furnished new parts and dispatched factory service 
men to correct the situation, at the behest of Alaska 
Pacific as well as Kadiak. Under these circumstances 
it is beyond dispute that Alaska Pacific's purchase 
of the motor from Murphy Diesel was upon the consider-
ation that a merchantable motor, fit and suitable 
for the marine purposes of Kadiak, would be supplied. 
Kadiak thus became the beneficiary of the contract 
with Alaska Pacific as the conduit through which the 
duty of ordinary care and the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness flowed. * * " 
The case of Freeman v. Navarre, another Washington case 
289 P2d 1015 is likewise in point and supports the same theory 
under a somewhat different factual situation, but recognized that 
·:·1 one serving as a conduit is not liable for the mal-performance or 
non-performance of the third party contractor. We submit that 
the Court should have recognized the principals enunciated in 
these cases and dismissed Brown from the law suit and granted 
Mallory relief solely against Valad who defaulted in performance. 
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In the brief of Valad, Pcint VII discusses the award 
of damages granted by the Court. Brown concurs in the argument 
there presented. The C curt did not adhere to the correct measure 
of damages applicable to this case. The Court allowed the intro-
duction by Mallory of a purported statement of overhead embodyir,; 
items which could not, under any reasonable cpplication of the 
law of damages be related to any loss suffered by Mallory for 
which it is entitled to redress against either Valad or Brown. 
(Ex 9 9, 101, l 0 2) 
The 12 KW heaters were reconstructed by Valad and 
accepted by Mallory. The 15 KW and 21 KW heaters were never 
satisfactorily completed. Valad because of the difficulties 
encountered over the 15 and 21 KW heaters refused to provide 
the 36 KW and the 50 KW heaters. 
It was conceded at the trial that the cost of securi~ 
replacement heaters and the incidental costs to reconstruct the 
test chamber to fit the new heaters, the cost of removal of the 
defective heaters and the installation of the new heaters were 
direct costs and under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code were 
allowable i terns of damage to be awarded to Mallory against Va lad 
and if the·~ourt refused to accept Brown's theory of the case, 
against Brown. The remainder of the so-called consequential 
damages which Mallory claimed and which the court allowed are 
not permissible damages under any theory. These damages encamp:' · 
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all of the overhead items of ~allory operation as taken from the 
unaudited operating statement of Mallory which the court admitted 
into evidence over the objection of both Valad and Brown. (Ex. 99) 
The basis upon which the counsel for Mallory claimed this could be 
done was called the "contract completed method of accounting" which 
may have validity before the IRS but hopefully will not be applied 
to the determination of damages in a simple case of non-performance 
of a sales contract. The damages thus claimed comprise items of 
which neither Valad or Brown could have had any awareness at the 
time of making the contract with Mallory to supply heaters, and 
which most assuredly could never have been within their contempla-
tion at that time. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code specifically sets forth 
the damages for which a buyer may recover against a defaulting 
seller at Sections 70A-2-711, 713 and 715, UCA 1953 as amended. 
We set these sections forth in full in the appendiE to this 
brief and submit that they are controlling. No reasonable 
construction of the language of thesasections could possibly 
encompass the "consequential" damages claimed by Mallory. 
CONCLUSION 
The realities of the relationship between Mallory, 
Brown and Valad are such that no justification exists, nor 
support in the record, for the court's having awarded judgment 
to Mallory against Brown for the loss it claimed to have suffered 
by reason of Valad's failure to perform its contract. Brown was 
not at any time a guarantor of performance by the manufacturer 
Valad. The only primary failure of performance shown in the 
exhaustive trial was the failure by Valad to manufacture heaters 
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as required by the Order placed with it. This :ailure resulted 
in Brown's inability to deliver the ordered heaters, but Brown 
had done nothing to contribute to or cause the failure. 
The Judgment awarded to Mallory against Brown should 
be reversed. The judgment awarded to Brown against Valad for tt>e 
loss suffered by Brown should be affirmed. 
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70A-2-205 l'!';IFOl!M COMMERCIAL CODE 
pa_\mrril n11 ti I' ,.·,l'o·h !lit" 1t1·,t tl.1 11i •. ,1 1:nl.l1•n R:1rton ~otor (',, .r' ~. 
J'~rlLP" f.1111·.! lo ('l•lll1•i1•fp :1 n111fr1111 Mllo11 t• . .:J', :!ltl .141 P. :.,!,J .t:_:'; 
tl1ert' ":u no drtiu1 t' nlt'f"l111i;t (1f th1· ·11in.J .. 
70A-2-206. !'irm offen.-An offer by a merchant to buy or sell ~n··•h 11 
a 1igned writing which by its terms gives assuranc~ that it will be• held ''\""· 
is not revocable, for lack of couaidecatiou, during the time stated "r 1f ,,,, 
time i1 1tated fc r a reasonable time, but in no event may such pc•ri"d .. , 
revocability e1c~ed three montl.s; but any such term of assL1r.1L1•··· "" .1 •, 
supplied by the •lfferce must b~ <eparntely ~igneu by the otT•·r .. r 
111-tol"J': L. 1966, ch.. 15-l, § 2-20~.. l<ult•-4 of rnn."lfru' 111111 
CT01s.Beferencn. 
ai:r1•1 1111•11t, ';'Cl,\·: 111.: 
t•1n ,,., ... ,. utia!.11 , ·•Ill r"' 
Form .. ! r.·1p1ir1·11 t•Jlf, .. 1.,:111 •. 11( r:H• 
711\ :.!..!••I. 
70.A..2-206. Offer &Dd accept&DCll in formation of contract -- I 
otherwise unamoigunusl)' indir 1teu hy the languai;e or cir"llnl'!"I" "' 
(a) an offer to make a contrad 'hA.11 be con'itru1·1l 11 .... lll\ .t 111_. .:·, 
1 
ance in any manner and by nny ruPdium rea.snnable i11 11, .. , 11. '·' 
stance&; 
(b) &D ord!r or other offer to buy goods for prompt or rurr• 11' -!.; 
ment ll&ll be coustru< d as inviting acceptance eithrr h;- a 1••· 1·; 
promia·! tu ship or by thl' prompt or current sbipmeut of, 01 ~-.r11. 
ing or •lf•Lconforming gooJs, but such a shipment .,f D<•ll•'""f"rni 
goods d<Hs uot constitute an aL·c~ptanct· if the scllC'r s ... a~r.•·,ii,, 
notifie~ tile buyer that the sh1pruP11l is o!fc·re.J Cini/ as 1111 II•'<'• 1:.111 
datiou to the buyer. 
(2) Where the beginning of a re4ues•,..J J•"I f,.,·u ""'"' is a rc':I"''· .! 
mode of acceptance an otlernr who is nnt 1w1it11·,l of :td••pla111•e "'1!~111 
reuooable time may treat the ·)fff·r a ... ha' i11:: L1p"'t•.J hr-fi·rt• n.1•c·ppf:wr1· 
Jllakl1"1: L. 1"6. eh.. lM, § 2-200. \ · · • .. ~. r · 1. 
Collater&I g.rera:CM. 
s..i .... ~J ll. :!:!, ::!.:l 
77 , . .I.~. S11h·"' §j l.-; ~4 ,•f "'"!· 
I"\ " ·I I \ I. H '-.... 
''"''" ... ··~ ''"' 
\•'lllj.' .. 1. 
.,10•·• !l11r1·uf ;'.1 
r..: 
\I !{ 
' ' ~ -
I 
70.\-2.207. Additional ter:ns in acceptance or conf.-- -'•'ion.- 1 11 .I I 
definite and 1euonable expression <•f ai·reptance or a w c rnnfir111:it1•· 1 
which ia 1ent within a reasonable time operates as an nceep· rvrn tbou11 1 
it 1tates terms lMiditional to or dift.,rent from thn•e otTcr-'·I < r a:.:rrr.t 11\"'' I 
unleas acct-pta.nce i& expressly made co11di1 io11al on 1t!'\:-r11t tn the add1!1"1 1 ~ I 
or difYereut tenns. 
(2) The additional terms are to br ronst rur<I as propo<als for ad.\ iii•' 





the offer expreuly lin1ita acceptance to the term~ of the offer; 
they D1ateri111ly alter it; or . 
notification of objection to them bas already been gi,·en or is gll<" 
within a reasonable time after notif'e of them is recci'l"ed. 
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SALES 70 • .\-2-:.!09 
3 Conduct by both parties whieh recognizes the exist'"'" u:· a c<·ll-
11,,uufficient to establish a contract for sale although the wr1tu1g> of the 
irti!I do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the term• of tht> 
srticular contract consist of those terms on which the writiugs of the par-
81gree, together with any supplemeutarr t<'rtn< icieorpnratecl under 8'1!' 
~!r provisions of this act. 
liJt<>rJ: I.. 1986, ch. 1M, § 2-207. 
tw-&eferencea. 
,\c1rp1an•·t ,,( .i;:ooti" 
H:,.i·:: 
.i~~111a!P "'" .. 11r;1111·t• rd p<r~· .. r11·.1· .. 
rn•l,;1;~)~\·l:.: ~~:11if'I ,Lll••ll •r J11lllf.1fl••ll <1r 
"': 1 ;, 1.\ · _' ;°' J ~I 
l·'J•~ f~4!1tJn• nf l'rl'"Llj•\l"·'l'"I 'UI• 
~: q,, I;; ' 
l \, 1•r•.,,.J,rt 11«'1"1 1[,i:r,, .i:,. 
H1.:l1ff·il rrJt't l1nn uf ;:oi·ol~ ma1111t·r .111·1 
I tr1•1 f tof. ;°'II..\ :_! •in_:. 
Hid•• .. of 1•i>n:otrurtwn, \,H1<Jf:or I·~· 
;11r:rl't'll.• hi, ;'tl.\ l·h1:,!, 
~11l•"'1'nt1•1l p«rf1•rm:11io '" ".'n.\.~··'J" 
Tr.i11 ... n·t1on:o1. ht·!11 t'•·r. "'""' b:1nt", ';'11.\ _ 
J(l.I, 
1"111···n·1·ion;1 l ,. r111 1 r,1, t or rl..1 Jiii('. ;1._\ 
:: 311.:. 
Collateral B.efereDccs. 
~ 1k·C=il. :.::.: 1 . .:J," 
';' ~ I . .J " :-0.dt•• ~ ~ l. .i. :.!'. 1 
Law Renew. 
1~.1,,J:111•11'. 1·1111trart111. ';'11\ ::1~1:.!. t·r,1(1.~111 1·u1llJH't•.1l l'odo• ••'•I ufl 
[11"1~!"1 l1m1t1tl1011 u' <J.,111 . .;1-. ,..,,.11111 '1ount .. r otr1r·. ~r•t'}:Ju 1 \.111111 _ ·1\ 1'1d 1 -,; ~" r. L H. \ "~:-10.l-2-208. Coune of performance or practi·::al oomtructicn.- l 1 1rethe contract for sale involves repeated occasicns for perform u11 e '>1 
ir party with knowledr:e of the nature of the P·~rform&nce and OJ•f'"r· 
~ty for obj•ction to it b;- the other, any course of performance acccpte•I 
101uiesce<l in without objection shall be rele\"&nt to determine th• mean. 
so: the agreement. 
'. r2. The express term• of the agreement anc any auch coursP. of 
~ormance, as well as any course of dealing and "CS11ge of trade. ·•hall be 
~trued whenenr reasonable as conaistent with each other; hut when 
lh "onstruction i> unreasonable. express terms 5hnll control colll'!le of 
lformance and course of performanre shall contrhl both conl'!le of deah11: 
~UJage of trade (section 70A-l-20j \. 
i31 Subject to the provisiona of the next aectir·n on modification and 
E' inch courae of performance ahall be relevant to show a wn. iver or cation of any term inconai~tent with such course of performan·,e. ry: L. 1"'6, c.ll. 15'., I ~208. ~ln•llfi<"3tioa, ·e.ci•~ion 1:id w:t11·rr, ;o.\. 
-.iererenceA. 
~··' 1 t~nr1· <lf iz<•rllh, rtf'1•rt, ;n.\-~·"'1; t"'''"'"'" d•fin•d, 70A·l-~01, 70A.~· 
a:.::; r•i:l·t~ on 1111rrnrwr rJ,.ll\rry. 
""t'1ll 
- -,.,:r .. 1 .. r ti"s.tri111ic .,,-j,J('nrP, ';'11.\ ~.~11:· 
w .. i\t'r of bu:.·er'• oh,if'f!'fint1!'1. ";l\,-~1:•li. 
Collateral llletorOJU:ts 
S:d,.·<::=~'4 <'t •lf'q. 
';'';" l'.,J.!';. ~A!P9 § 71 rt .'lt"t( 
!OU.209. Jlodi.ftcation, resc:ilaiou ud W'&iver-(1) An agrtem•?nt 
iafymg a contract within this chaptor needs no considoratioc to be 
~mr 
.'2) A •igned agreement which exclude• moditkation or resci.,;ion ~J:· ~hr a aigned writing cann"t be otherwise mod: 6cd or rescinded, hut 
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~ALE.' 70A-2-71 l 
&mpJ07ee 1t.ock parcba.s.e pl&J1. 
l'L111111n' 11p"11 l 0 rf»1mir1i.: 1·r1 1·1••.' ,., i· r 
··h:i .. r.t "'""" 1lf hn'rl ··oq .. •ri,11011 ••ii•• 1 
10 11·1·urrhaar "~'"''11\•·nl 1t' .. 1Qr .. t• I 1••11·r 11 
,·uqolP_,,,. lrfl rm1>h•~n11·11t 1r "·' .. ,J1 ... 
,·haqrrd. upon tf11u·h1tri:•· 11: I<' '" ,.,.,,.k 
J•llllllf'rt tn t'orpt•r:.111111. 11n I upou l"nrpor:i 
1111n'• rrfuatt.l tu •&l"<"t'j•I :111 I J ;p· for .,,., k 
\d1t•11 t.-ad•rr•I. •mplo'.\C"r roul.1 m11111lt11n 
.Jrf1un for airrrr•I Jl"'"r Jl1p·1 ·• ' .,.1·11d11h 
1101,.1, In'-· ~et' JlH, u P ::.1 fi~!' 
Meaaun of 4amacu. 
Tlif" mf'a11ur1• nf •l.1m:i;!•'... 11 :irt 1 "' i., 
.. ,.nrr to rrf'O\ rr I'' tr of Ii:"' ola .... 1.i. 1~ .1 
mall• r o( ~f"111•r·d l1<w llnll:.rd 1·1,,,\,_ \tf;.:. 
1·0. t". 1'nnlW'll1tht"'i1 Wl\J:'"" .. \' \t:i,.h11i1· f'n .. 
H• l' •.1, lhl P. ~':!~. 
Waiver and °'°PPtl 
Jn ;11f1un 1., 1u·l1r .. f lt1t•\•·~•1·,..: ·111 
, ) •I 1• !•J fl.,..,, .. r )•llft'l11111u j1flf',., \\ l., r1'JT1 
10· • 1,.1..r.t 1"•'1>'' • ,:, ·l "1: • rn 11·h •,•' ,] ,,J n• t 
(".IT:: '' r Ill• '' ~ \\ .• rr-. I I::. ..,. I • .. h 'l\ I'.: 
r.· 1 .,.,.' 1,, rrr1· ,\I' ni"lrh 111"' h·1•· k '1!•"11 ;11 ' 
,.,., !11 uu ... ;Jfl.t 1n <"on .. ! .r:i.11) <'h1111111Jl (•i I 
h1·1,.·l1' n( •:tit> .q.,.j ,jrl \ , ... ~. nf h.'IT\"('llltrr 
:in I 11 ... 1•!111jl UJ ,.,. p:i'.\ m('nl nf full J•llT· 
d1.111f' pr1r1·. \\:tl\rd uturn o( marhrnP 
l'1•n•n:1.J:1trd ""oi;:nn A ~f:irhinl"' Cn. 
Wr1a:li!, ",fi 1" J'.:. l! o f'. P37, fii•Ln-
r·1111lw I in 7.", 1· J~4. Zlil:'l P. ':'31. 
! n tt ·111•11 liy •rll1·r o' l1art"r1! 1nl: m:u·bint" 
to rPr 1\·t"r purrhaat" prirf', wh4"rr1n c1f'fpn1~ 
;u1• r1 ntrn1l,.rf Hal nuiint' rlid ""' fulfi~I 
'"',, .. n( t1tarrnnty, li5'?'t\1ni of 11At111f:it'fion 
l".1rJ h iirfrn1lont watbcut rrft•l1ng ita roi 
!:•11t•. on r1•prr••nlatiot' or IM'l!er·• &l(rnt 
tlutl ti 1111•y rn11tairot'1I 11l 1frftl('nf lhnt l~f'"f 
, .. 1• 1·rr-.r11t. 1li1I not .. ,, ... ,, df'f4"r11lant frotn 
d,.n,·111i;: -.1at('11wnt o! lllli11fa('twn 1n t:'nrd. 
1 ·n,;,.,,.1•la 1r,f \\.:&ill"" .i \faf'hinr l'n. 
Writ,'. 1.f ·,,; T" -,-.:!. J!itl P P:l7, d1•lln~11•h<"oi 
in-~,. \..~L ~ .... IP. 7'31. 
70.l-2-710. Seller's incident&! d&m&gea -Inridental dam•i;"s to an 
a!!grieveJ seller .nolude r.ny commPreially reasonable char1~e•. e'.'<penses or 
1 11m?r1i~ ... i 11 !;~ i1."urrP~l in stPpping delin~ry, rn the- transpor:ation. <·Rre and 
·us« .. ly ,,( gouJH after the buyer's br·,ach. in conn~ction with return or 
re>ale "' tli" ['!'ood1 or otherwise resultin~ !rorn the breach. 
JlL,tory. L. 1965, ell. 154, § 2-710. Collateral BeftrtDCts. 
~,1 •• e=.1:0. Je~. 3,1 ( ). 
".' ... l ... J.~. Salf'I § 477 el l'll'q. 
70.l-2-711. Buyer'a remedies in gener&l-Buyer'1 MCUrity interest in 
rejected goocb.- 1 l) Where the .e!ler fails In make dP!inry or repudiate. 
or !he hi1ye·· rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes e.ccept&nce then 
,,-ith respect to any gvods iu.-eoh·ed, anrl with r••pect to the who!e if the 
breach gnes to the whole contract (section iOA-2-612). the buyer may 
··&nee! and whether 1•r not he bu done so may in a•l·iition :o reco,·ering so 
much or the price u hes been paid 
•n1 ··cover .. and haH dantal?PS ur.dn the next <e••tic·n u to all the 
l?norls 1t'Te,·ted wJ. .. thrr or no: they ha,·e been i.lentificrl to the 
1•,.ntract; or 
Ii r··f"'n\·rr la1:1:i~1·' f,,r nnuJclivr-y A~ prrn·i1l··d in t~ is rhartrr (~ec­
t111n iOA-2-713). 
12) Whne the <eller fails to deliver or repudiates the hu~·er msy also 
(al i( the gc•<Hls hn,-e been identifierl reconr them as :>rcn·icled in this 
chapi.•r ;•ection iOA-Z-502); or 
(b1 in a proper csse obtain speci6" performance nr rPp]P\·y the goods 
as provi1leJ in this chapter (section 70A-2-71G:. 
(3) On ri!!'lil rul rejection or jnatifiable re\·ocation or acceptance a 
buyer baa a security interest in goods in hi• possession or control for an~­
paym~nt.I n.n·'•· "" their price and any expenset1 reasonably inrnrr•d in 
their inspect. rereipt, transportation, care a11d custody an.I m•y hol•I 
11 
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IOA-:!-"ill L ~lt'OR~I l O:ll~l!CKCl.\L COOE 
such go0<ls anJ resell them 111 like mauuer a- an aggricv••d scll•·r , ,,., .. '"'· 
IOA-2-i06'. 
-l"J': L- lllHli, ell. l&I, § 2-71:. 
Crou-B.eterenc~s. 
Hu~·1·r·'I d.1111a~·h r .. r !.r. i•·h 1!1 r··~ T·I 
,1rl"q1f('d J:"o.!M. ;n \:.::I"' 
B11.\1·r' .. ri~ht'I Oil 1r::1·r11;" r ·,I'' r· 
711,\ :,!-1jPJ. 
I '11ri· 1.,. :-rl l.·r ni i11.1•r .. 1 .. r 1•· 11 1, r , r 
Ju .. 1·ill111•·11t 1· .. 11tr:1<·! -, \ .; .. :_ 
H•'l1w.J :•·• 11111· ~:ti iy :1°1111111 , .. ; • · 
1:. "· .11··1·-I I 
J'.lf!, 'I_"'" 
Aruwer ILDd counterclaim o! buyer 
- \ 
r .... : 1 liar. 111 s~·ll<'r' ... :•" ! ,oi: fur I·:: 1.1 rw 
,,,, 1>1,rr ... 1 ... · pri<"f' rl11r q;1.;,., ro1;T•.i1·t 11• 
.. a!'" 111• .... , 1• Pllf tn tr1:!1 .11.•I 1\ :1" a'' :'lr.\1 ·I 
111.I .. '11? r· r, • "' \,;1 "i .. of r1 "' i._ .. 11 '" nf i ·II tr:•· ' 
1., l1i111 .. :11 ••11i.:h 11" J1a•I 11n' 11;,•:1d1·rl rl"" 1-
.. ;,,,1 t!n•r• o<''. lH• 1.1 11 .. t f,, 1,, 1 1· d• '""'*'"I ), .. 
ri~lil. nr Pt•\\ t:11I n1.],·r··d I·~· :-:u1•r1•11• 
• ·,,urt 1111 11:\ r1·1·1·t .. .1 "' .?•111.:m• 111. 
.1111t•11,J t.i .. :tll""<'' :11 .. I ,·11111il•'r•l:1J11 "'' ,.., 
rn n• 1. .J .. 1.,:11.:•··' (,,, 11111! r:1r1',. 'i •lat •111 
l1..tru1l ll1·.1tiui: ,\ Li~l·l 111i.: t ·,, Y. ~lt·1 "t •. 
,:n I'. _'11. ·,., J' 1:.1. 
Htl\ ,.. '""~'"''I 111° J.r.1•.:.11..' i11·f··1 ,.,,.1,." 
.I' 11n:1 fur l1rl":11·h nf "·1rr •111.\ 111 1 ir•I• r 
p 0 ,.,. ,.,.·11.i .. 1, !·11n .11 .. 1·: 11 1,, .. ,. o•r I •r 
1'Lir"h·1 j•"I•'\'. 1'1·1ru1: \·LI'"' :0-!11\ l" I" 
, .I. t \\ "•·lt>r Lu11d1l'r 1 ·,, ••I {' ".< 
.: I ·, I '. ' 141 ••• • ..:~ 1 • \ , I . H: . 1; :, ~ • : I •, · ' r" 1 • \ • :1 I' " " 
:--1"'' 1·., , . F:1r·t1•'t:"1. 1· .... 11 1'111<•11 hi I 
.·.1;:-.::1• I' 111:-:,. 
Choice of remedie11. 
J 11 .. 1 •· : .t u! ,.1ii ; .: t • · r I· r. :1 • !, • 1 t l~ • r 
au ""1·r1-. .. ~ or in11 Ji,.,i .. rr:11,1• • · ,·1. •. 1, 
h11\·"r 111.1 ,. l1ri11A: :.rt 1ur1 fur ,I •'II 1 ..:"" ~·1 r 
tli~ tor! or "·ruui.:-. \\' t1;.:li1 \ If· "•'. 11; 
t• ,"'1lit."I, !.ill P. 95•i, I.. If \. l. 11..J:. 1 \"I 
Tluu1i.::1 u11 l1r1•:1··h ur' warr '".• •·' •I 
;i Lii (\f,111; 1'11· t llf' l.IJ~'f"~ 111ii.:1 I 11.0 \ I ' ,j " t 
!hr dif1'1•r1•111•f' h1•t wr1·11 th1· \ :.)tp 11: :/•• 
11 , 1\11· '"""iit 11•11 '' arr.11il1··I .. , .. t 1' • \ , '•11 
1ti 1111· ,,.,,1111011 in \\l·1•h ., '·'' .,,], I .. · 
1111i,:lit ro·•r1111l 11111•1•n•I all•~ n·ru\ .. r I .... i., T 111· 
purl"h:1 .. ,• pri1·f' . ..;.1uil1•.lt:1k1•r flru:-. • " 
.\n.Jl°r)IHIJ, :'j1) I'. J)~I, lt.-;' }' I;(;,, 
Pur. li.1"1'r nf n11l11111.o!,jl1· 1111 Ill•' il\111• r.! 
ru11T r;•ol 1111 o~ \ :1 £' I r.1 •I iui: 111 ,.f .!11 • • r. 
ir 1)1'1·r.111<I• .t. 111R)' r "d '" :1nirni · Pntr ... 
:'lfld "U" f11r .l,1m •L!'1'·, <lt l.r 1r1;1~· ro 1•n1h; If' 
or r1•~, 111.t ' u•!I r:1 r ! :1 n d 1111 1<' 1" ~r1" \ rr r ,),I 
··:i r 11 ~ \\I :.t ',14 1 .. 11! p . .i1l t•ut 1011 1· •nt r-.. t, 
-iv-
Collateral Kefennces. 
~ ,,,.,.~Jl.1, J~~fl rt °''''l· 
-- , .. T.s. 1-':dr• § !'-4. ;1o1 r .r ~ ...; ,1 .• 
•' ···1 
H1.;I I n( ar1in11 fnr t.r.·:i··l1 of , " 
"l111h P"lf'T'•"'l.' It·~'"" op{·n f•·r' 
•L."'' • 1111 11! or npi,:uti;lf ion 1 lio f Pr11.- ,,f 
'I' ! I '"t t If' l•fll!'('ff ~ I;~ ,\, I.. H 
1:...'• 
1:, ,,,,. t ,, 1,.- I:•. "f ur I·,,,,· r.1• ' .. 1; 
11·:.: '. 
I·"'" \ 1: 
- ' 1.•·· 
11111 In· •':11111 •I d • 
al1f'r11:i1" .11 .1 1·d ,.1,. ••. ,. I , ... 11,· 
ml"n' nf :t•"'"'· "n 1· k "' · .... ~ ......... · • "• 
ronrl:1 ... 1\1' 11f ,.,, n .. •" 1 1 .. · r 
r•'lltl'•h rl111'-"" I• 11· ...... f .. 
f ',.uk ·, ('.,• ,., I: ', r I \J,,• • • ·,, •" I 
1 "'. :o: I'. l'" 
Defense of breach of '"·ura .. "lty 
It 1• rlf'mP11l:ir~ th:ll iot1p11: ·'" r. 
r:111t11·" 11rt• ro11d111<>1'1• ;·r•·• 1··1•·•·• i,, r. 
111 .. •11 l>r1•:11·l1 in .1•·! I"'' 1 •. ,. "' I' ~ 
I I, .... ;•r(o I', ~f 1'·1:1 jf II,, .. \0 ,j 
'•lrtl uf at11<·l1· 1111:•1 ],·" 
c'o•1-. 1i·? ,.,.,. \\ ~·" ,\ •· 
J;.1 rf,..,, I" 1· ·:~· 1 -. ' I' '•: • ·I 
1,.• •. ; 1· Ill-: I' ..:.J ;..:·. 
•·' 
"•q,1 .. 1.111!' .1:1·::·· '" .... t d 
9::! 
to l·r• ·1· h ·" " • r• •' \ 
~.· 1 11 ~• : .. I:.' 1:•: .. 1:::: r: ,',; "' ,.::: • I\ I'.,.; 
f' • r. I. 1 .. ,. J' r ,. • · :-- •"" . 1. r • ' . I '~ · • · f ', 
,\ ' I II I 11 " I' I 'II • ;, 3 t . . :i ..: ' I I 7 .. I ' ~" I; 
111 a..i1n11 1,,. •\•ll•·r of i.:,·1···'••.: 
,·l·n 1· t11 r,1·0;1•r l''IJ"C.•11.'\llllo· I'"'•·· 
tl1•H tl1at tlt>ff'rirl~nt ~:nr 111;1" 1 
1Ji:11, ti\'I' ti·l\·11' ffl:• l, ;'lnrj rnr fi " ' 
l·r• .11·h1•ol tr""'"' u' "·:irr:int\·. \\;,,. 1 · 1 
·1l·I•·. wh••rf• it a1•1•t'.1r•·•I tliar IL.1t\•• .. •· r 
· ,,, u1•1•r:1f1••l :ift,·r "''ll1·r'j11 f'UIJd": • •·• 
lo-fl ,J.·1···111 1 :1111·~ randt. a1n1l 1f 1 r , 
Ii.it\',.,,., w;i .. 1'011111111 ... 1 fur n1nt1· ''· '" ' 
1111: 111·r1111l of ti11• 0!:1.' "· it "·:1• 11 ... 
... 1·llo-r'a owll rtr'nrt• :in•l hY itit • 01. .. · 
1 'on·'«•liolatf'•l Wn.:t•n .I: ~f:trhiru• 
Wt1,,:li1. ;,fl r. 3":.!. l!1t1 I'.!'~:'. 
Llen or buyer. 
u • ._,···r h:1• 11•1 li1·n on enfl1i~ fur :111• .. 111· 
c•f 1··ird1ftR rri1·r rai•I tl1l'rr1•n 'lflk·· ,i,, .. 
ha .. ··-·t•n a lort•;11·l1 of w;trr:lnt~ 11'\'·"''''' 
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IOA-:!-il:! 
}:r,,,. ... t r. Farller ro , ll<'tl!u·r 161. F. ·:d 
~lf\.4. r1T111~ r:t"<'" f·om othf'r juri.!dit"1nn" ;1~ 
wrJ: 0 \\1lll•roa, ~a..ltc>I', \'ol. ~. _,t r:, ., 
§ 4'•:. I'· 1~%. 
\\"hf'rt> b11yl"'r, 11pon in111rf'rtinn n~ Yr;:,. 
tJ.hJt>, _,, Salr I .11k1· City 1h11'r" i fM111 
l.11111l'11~ 11.1. promptly notitif'J 111Pllf'r 1 l1nt i,,. 
r1•1f'l'f1··~ '''liZf'l.ablPt hf'r&Ulllf' of th,,.1r un-
mc-rrl.-rnht.lr ton,Jition an<t requP~ff'd 111· 
1trudh1n!t fro1n seller "' to tht>ir •lispo:-oi-
tion, :in•l •t>ll('r instn1rterl bu,·pr to d- ..... 
posr of \t"flt>lalolf't Rf !Jp9f pril"(; ohf~inal IP 
:uut, ilfft"r rt":wit• ir. &('('orda.nr(' th• re-wit!., 
R('tt>plf'd nrt prorreJ.!I thrrf'from •itltout 
qualifirntion, lllE'Jlf"t U•PQINl fo rrorm1rd 
rPs("i•111on 111nrl di!lrh:tr2'r nt nr15,!in:tl uJ • ., 
~o tlint JU•iJ:n1··111 ~rtf1ni: a111.Jl' repnnt1:•11 
order in pro('~1·.J1 1.: 1111.i. r r ... 1.·r.11 f)rti"t :1 
t,le ,\jtt1('ul1ural \'un1mod1 1 1c~ .\('t nf ]!1.;.1 
\\:llll .dfirmp,j or :ipJ>r·il ~.r111 _, ! 
('n. \'. ll("'ll'lf'r, }tiC F :,:.! ~iq 
Waiver. 
A huyf'r <lid nnt "';ii,(' hi' r1i:l 1 
l('lnrl the pure hue or au 1'111,rn .. 1. 
hr1•ad1 u( 11arr:int~ that if w1111:d r ,1, 
rrJ•POff"',lly taluni;: it h:irk for a,! ,u•:· 1 
:ind rt-p.11n1, whPtE> n1•th1n,;: m•"•' 11" 
tC'n•!··•I tlian to fA'r"t •! ,. ~··~· .. r anq1:1· "t' 
tu11i1y to put tl•r r--11 1·1Lon •• 
woulol run. :O:.t111I••• , ;. · · 1 ',, \·. 
1tor •. :.o l' 3 lll, lfi~ I 
Hu~ t·t m:-iy w;11\· ·' • • 
''" h r1;:ht . .\1h . .rio" r1. 
Inc· ,. Stidd.;.~, I' )_'; l 
;:11, .. h,.,J 111 !>:! I 111 I· 
70.&-2-712. "Cover''-Buyer's procurement of substitute good! 
After a breaci '~ithin the prece,Jino; section tho bunr moy """'"' 
making in good faith anJ without unreasonable ,Jela)· any '""" 1', 
purchase of or contract to purchase goods in snbstitutinn for those diie fr 
the aeller. 
(2) The buyer may reco,.er from the seller as dAma~es the rli!Ter" 
between the c•ist of coYer and the contract pricP toi::cth••r w1lli al/'. 
dentAI or con1·~quential JamAges as hcrl'inarter d•fined r ,ect ion iu.I ~.;r 
but less expen~es sa\'ed in co11Sequence of the aP.ller's brrac h. 
(3) Failure of the buyer to el!ect coYor witlin this s,l't ion d'"'' ",'' 
him from any other remedy. 
8Utol'}': L. JHl5, clL 154, § 2-712. 
Crou-Bef1rucn. 
Ruy cf,. lla111A1~··-. (,.r 11n11·l••l1\ 1·1 ~ tor 
putliation. 7'flA ~ 7i3 
lluvt"t'" intoidf'r1t11l ::rn.J rMt,.•"111•·11 .d 
damo·~,.~. -:'tJ.\-:.!···1 i. 
Ru~·<'r',. ri~ht to -.tpt•.-1ti•· prrf11rman•·" 
rtplev1n, 70A·:.?-:Jfi. 
'1i.i1~.1t1•·•• ,,' c• ,, 1 • 1' 1 -,. \ 
H•"1""r1:il.J1• f l!'P 7 \ J _:" ! 
I\, -1:1 I•· I·,. ~· I lo-~. 7 • \ : -
C<>llateraJ Referencei:::. 
.... .r .... c::::q111i,:-
-, l '..J .!" :O:.alt>~ § ·,.;" 
70.t.-2-713. Buyer'• damages for nondelivery or repudiation 
Subject to th·~ provisions of this ~haptrr with respect :n nro .. f .. r 1· 
price (section 70A-2-723), the rr.easurr of damages for nn11.J,.J ., , 
repudiation b1 the seller is the di:Teren"'' hctwem the market pr.,,· ·" 
time when thi! buyer learned of the brrn..J1 and the contract pri<'e I•~ 
with any incidental and cor.seq~ent ial clamages prm·ided in this ,.1,,, 
(aeetion 70.A-2-715), but lrsa exp~nse> sa,·ed iu consequence of 1b,• ;r: 
breach. 
(2) Harhet price i.a to he determined as of the place for tender"' 
cuea of rejection after arrhal or revocation of acceptance, as of the r' 
of arri"al. 
auto..,: L. 11116, c11. 154, I :i.113. 
Crou-lLeference". 
Hu,·rr"11r prn1·urr11u·ut .,( !lul.,..1 it 11(' ;.::11"1'. 
711.\ ..: ; I:. 
-v-
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Hu_vf"'r"9 ri1ht to 14pr('ifir pnform.1" 
tPJ•lro:1n, '."OA·~·716. 
l'rnu( ot m~rkt'f prir•· t1mf' :i11il I 
71 1.\ .:: 7:.:J 
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70A-2-il5 l':'>IFt>R~I '.<Ht~ffRCIAL CODE 
(2) The mfasure of ,J.:.11a:· .. s f •r brearh of warranty ia the different<' 
at the lime anc place of A<Tel'l8D<'e bet\\eeu the Value Of the goods 81'-
Cepted &lid the value thry woulJ have baJ if they had been as warranted, 
UD!eu special cirenmstanees show proximate damages of a different am.,unt. 
(3) In a proper caae any incidental and con.qeqnentid rlamag,·s tmder 
the next section may also be reconr~J. 
Jlinory: L. 18'16, clL 1114, § 2-7H. 
Crou-&ereunces. 
HurJt•u of P~t:d•li!\l1i111o!' ),rf'ad1 aft~·r 
•·t>11rau1·1". :n.\.:! tiU7. 
lluyt·r·~ Janu1.I("" for no111lrli' ery or r••· 
vuJi.1ti1•11. 711A-:..'·:Ll. 
Buyer":oi i:tr1.Jr ital :an.I ~·1111~<"•1'tC'nti.d 
.Iamai.:e-... 711.\-:.! 71j_ 
Hu_n·r· ... r• ui. .!11"' iu ~1·111·r.d 7P.\ ~ 7"11 
70 ~~~·~1-~,1 ~1."11 vf 11;11111.:•·" fr1111: lln 1•rin•. 
litto.J,. or 1·0111li 1•t "1·1111furm111.:·· lo ',,,.. 
tr:id, :-o.\-:!·I111i (:! 
lfl'\u1·:1t1011 of :.nt"pt.ui .. t.• in "l.eo •' nr 111 
l'a.rt, ;'UA-:: 1;0K. 
Collateral Jle!erenc11. 
~:ll1• .. C==4 I "J. 4:?";". 
• ';M t',J,:-i. Sal1•'4 ~§~:!LI, .Ho E"t 9P'1. 
Barr1·oi d:1im of hrtarh o( warr1ntv u 
111uhjf>cf of !'lt'totr, ~uuntt•r1•lni111, or f.roia.'I 
art ion. I A.. L. R. ;,!J 11: l. ti!'-4. 
Drt•a1·h of warr.111f_; ;1 .. to titk a~ witl1i11 
!'tatutor~ 1•ro\ L' nu ri··1;1,ri11a: no111·r c.f 
lirt':td1 ut" \'.,1rr.11'I.\ "11 •.11" uf gund:ot, 11-4 
.\. 1.. IL ;11'.'". 
Bu,·.·r'..i ri•furn o( .. 111. j .. d ••( !' df' anJ 
a1·n•1;t:llH't' u( t1··11r11 uf or 1•n•1lit for tit• 
J•Ur1·J.;, .. ,. 1·rin• al'I af1',•,·1i11i.:: ri~hl lu r1•1u\1•r 
"l'l'<'l..J JamU!rt'f for hff':lt•h 0( '.\ I ,II•' 
1;;; .\.I •. R. lu7;, 
Form and aub11ta11cr of noti· ,. \\ 1-1. 
h11yrr of good• n1u11t jl'l\C in or•l•·r 1,, ,, 
1•11\ t•r J:tm3Jf'I for •ellPr's hrt"arh Pl \' 
raut~·. 53 A. L. R. :?d :!:o. 
~1,•a1n1rp in rl.-ment~ of rrf'o\·f'rv of 1 .• 
1•r r1·"'ri11,Jin;.: aalt." of dum1·111l1r nOi111 ,. :. 
1t1·JJ .. r'11 Lrt•a.-11 of wartanf\·, :1::0 .\. I.. I: 
1:::J. . 
~t':ISUre u( Jn.m:1J:l'!l in adinn for l•r• " 
,,( warranty ot till~ to penon:1l pr••:···· 
a!'I tl1r cllu1· o( tl.e l roprrty •ir 11.o· 1-r, 
11111• 1nt1•r"-"'· IJ A. J •. R. :!d 13~:.!. 
P11rd1us1·r",. Ult" or att .. mplr1I ume ur :1,.1 
1·1'°" known to hr d1·fP('fi\·r :.i1 afl'.-,·1111.: 
1la111:1~1· .. rr• O\'f'raLlt> for hrt"111·h of w:. · 
r.inty. :s:i A.. L.B. 2d !11. 
H1i:ht of Je:d•r &J::ain•t 111• vrn•lnr- t'• 
t'B!le ot Lrt1o·u•h o( •·a..rra.uf\· ;u tu :1r11. 
~~ .\. l.. R. IJJ and d~ .\. 1.: R. ~·.; 
Time within whi,·h hu~·er of goo•l1111 11111~· 
fi\"t- nutit't' in orJ,·r 111 rrC"Q\f'r d::m.1..:• 
fur :.••llt'r's hrra,·h ,.r t>IJ•ft."M \\;1rt,11.1_, 
ll .I. L. R. ~1~. 
1· ... t' O( :1ftidP ,,~ J,U.\l'r ~" \\".1i\Pr ' 
ri~!.I tu r1••1•11i.\ t'ur I r.1·:·1. 1111•.11 !, "' \\ .. · 
~~::; ~ .: 't;~ ;~11 '.~L-~'i .. ' ·~! ~·;·;:! ~ .. '~'I ,-~~·1, ( I: 
11; ... 
70.A-2-715. Buyer'1 incidental a,nd consequential damages.-(11 111·: 
dental damages result111~ from ti"' sdlcr's lircach induole 1•xpr11'"' r""'"'· 
ably incurreJ in inspection, rec•·ipt, tran•portation atul care a111l <'lt-l<ni·. 
of goods right:'ully rejccteJ, any comm~r,ially rrasonabk d1arg•·•. HP""'' -
or commiuioo:1 in connection with effcctiug conr anJ any other r,·as .. 11al•I · 
expense iucideot to the delay or other breat·h. 
(2) Couscquential Jamavcs resulting from the seller's bn·ach i11clu1h· 
(a) &Dy Joaa resulting from general or particular requirements a11,l 
need• of which the seller at the time of contracting haJ rrason I• 
know and which could not rtasonably be pre-·enteJ by cover ..r 
otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately r~aulticg Crom any 
breach of warranty. 
lllstory: L. 11186, clL 15', t ~·r16. 
ero... ... r1renc11 .. 
Cool rndual mo1lifi1·;d 1011 ut li1111 :ii~.,, n( 
r~u1nJy, :"IJ.\ .:_: ; \!I. 
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Enu11e hr tailurt• of prt••ur1•1i..1· 0 ! 
Jitinn1, 10A·:!-6lj. 
Oblia-:atJUu ot l'on1J faith, :oA.-J.::···:. 
Ht•u11•1Hr~ lihrr1.1lly :i1lmini,.ff'rt··I. '.'" \ 
, .. ,;. 
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